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 Abstract:  
Next generation access networks are expected to bring ubiquitous broadband access and have attracted 
interest of municipal governments. This paper investigates the support by municipal authorities for the 
rollout of such a city-wide wireless broadband access network. Different business cases for 3G and WiFi 
operators are developed and it is indicated how to model the specificities for commercial versus public 
players. Furthermore, a game theoretic approach is used to investigate the investment options of the 
municipal player. It is shown that a partnership between a commercial and public player is the most 
likely investment strategy. However, bringing more players into the competitive environment reduces the 
intention of the commercial partner to engage in the public private partnership (PPP). 
Keywords: game theory, techno-economics, municipal network, wireless access 
network, 3G, WiFi 
 1. Introduction 
The demand for broadband access keeps growing worldwide. In 2009, over 466 million 
people were using broadband Internet services, and this number will keep growing in 
the following years. Together with broadband access, mobility is gaining importance. 
In 2009, there were 4.7 billion mobile telephone subscriptions worldwide (ITU, 2009). 
Resulting from these two needs, mobile broadband access is an important issue for 
operators. However, recent numbers on mobile broadband usage show a low uptake, 
with only 8.5 million users worldwide by the end of 2009. Nevertheless, with growth 
figures averaging around 5% per quarter (Point Topic, 2010), there is significant 
business potential in this market. 
The introduction of these next generation access networks (NGANs) is expected to 
bring a broad range of indirect revenues. Efficiency gains, attracting new businesses 
and the resulting raise in employment are only a few examples. These are the main 
drivers for public authorities to invest in the rollout of NGANs.  
In this paper focus is on the rollout of a mobile broadband access network. Techno-
economic papers studying the viability of WiFi and WiMAX networks have already 
been conducted in Smura (2006), Sadowski, Verheijen, and Nucciarelli (2008) and Van 
Ooteghem et al. (2009). General conclusion is that a deployment can be profitable, if 
the right technology, rollout zone and strategy are chosen.  
The standard economic evaluation methods evaluate projects from a monopolistic point 
of view. However, operators do not act in a monopolistic market, and competition 
between different operators is fierce. Game Theory (GT) offers methods to bring 
competition into the business models. An overview of the use of GT in the 
telecommunication research area can be found in Altman, Boulogne, El-Azouzi, 
Jiménez, and Wynter (2006). However, the different topics described focus on non-
 economic games. Extensive economic games covering a fixed network rollout have 
been described in Casier, Lannoo, Van Ooteghem, Verbrugge, Colle, Pickavet, and 
Demeester (2009).  
This paper will apply game theoretic concepts to perform an extended economic 
analysis of a wireless network rollout. In Lannoo et al. (2009), a municipal WiFi player 
and a 3G mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) were already brought into 
competition.  
Several research questions still need to be addressed in this topic. This paper extends 
the research of Lannoo et al. (2009) with the following questions. Will the municipality 
be interested in a public private partnership (PPP) with a commercial WiFi provider in 
the first place? Or will it rollout its own network, thereby avoiding any problems with 
hidden subsidization of a private project and competition distortion? On what grounds 
will this interest be based?  
To answer these questions, the methodology proposed by Verbrugge, Casier, Van 
Ooteghem, and Lannoo (2009) was followed. After sketching the setting of the 
business case in Section 2, the business cases for the two considered access 
technologies, WiFi and 3G, is developed in Section 3 and 4. The business model for the 
WiFi player of Lannoo, et al. (2009) is adapted to capture the impact of a municipality 
on the cost and revenue structure. While private players focus on value creation for 
shareholders, and typically use the Net Present Value (NPV) concept to capture this 
value creation, a public player is interested in public welfare gain. To cover this value, 
the indirect revenues concept is introduced.  
After describing the basic concepts of GT in Section 5, Section 6 and 7 perform the 
actual game theoretic analysis. First, focus is on the strategic choice of the 
municipality. The municipality can choose to enable a commercial player to rollout a 
wireless NGAN via a PPP. Or it can also choose to act alone, as a full commercial 
 player. Using a game theoretic approach, the best strategy for the municipal player is 
identified. In Section 7, extra players are brought into the competitive environment, to 
control the viability of the PPP under realistic assumptions. The numerical models used 
for the business modeling allow tackling this complex problem. Finally, Section 8 
provides conclusions and recommendations. 
2. Case setting: Providing wireless broadband access 
in a municipal setting 
To investigate the different partnership and competition scenarios for the introduction 
of city-wide wireless access networks, a general model has been developed. The 
business cases derived from this model will focus on a rollout in the city of Ghent. 
Ghent is the third largest city in Belgium, with over 240 000 inhabitants. Ghent also 
houses 50 000 students and attracts almost 400 000 tourists per year. The rollout area 
considered in this paper was identified as the most interesting in Van Ooteghem et al. 
(2009) and covers 14 km2. Before going into detail on the business cases of the 
different players, an overview of important factors influencing these cases is given. 
User adoption is necessary to estimate the future revenues, the technology of the 
different players serves as input factor for the network modeling, and other general 
economic parameters are used to evaluate the business case. The regulatory aspect will 
also be discussed, since for projects with public support, competition regulation is an 
important aspect, and will as such influence the business cases. 
2.1. User adoption 
User adoption is often the basis of the economic calculations since users are the main 
revenue driver. In a competitive setting, the number of customers is not fixed per 
 player. The total adoption is considered to be given by a general adoption model and 
split the adoption per player.  
The Gompertz model is chosen to estimate the user adoption of Mobile Internet through 
the years. According to Cardenas, Garcia-Molina, Sales, and Capmany (2004), this 
adoption model gives the best fit in case of a telecom business case compared to other 
models. The mathematical formula (1) has three parameters to change: its inflection 
point (a), slope (b) and size (m). The parameters used in this case are shown in Table 1 
and visualized in Fig. 1. Recent research into the penetration rate of wireless broadband 
showed an average penetration rate around 16% (De Marez, Evens, & Stragier, 2011). 
The adoption model used in this paper shows an adoption around 17% in 2011. 
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑒𝑒−𝑒𝑒−𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡−𝑎𝑎 )  (1) 
In this case, the market is divided in four different segments, since the adoption of the 
service will differ between them. 
Table 1: Adoption parameters for the different market segments (Van Ooteghem et al., 2009) 
User type a b m 
Inhabitants 2011.5 0.64 20.00% 
Students 2011.5 0.64 33.33% 
Tourists 2011.5 0.64 5.00% 
Industry 2011.5 0.64 5.00% 
 
  
  
Fig. 1: Adoption curvesA 
A Tourists and Industry adoption overlap 
 
2.2. Business players 
The model introduced in this paper studies the introduction of several wireless access 
networks. In order to avoid excessive complexity, the different possible technologies to 
offer the service have been reduced to WiFi and 3G or their successors. Previous 
research (Van Ooteghem et al., 2009) already showed that in small, densely populated 
areas, WiFi technology is commercially interesting. This paper will focus on the 
strategic choice by the municipality, in a setting with two WiFi players and one 3G 
player. The two WiFi players represent the municipality and a commercial partner 
respectively, while the 3G player is an established mobile network operator (MNO), 
directly competing with the WiFi providers. 
2.3. Business case evaluation parameters 
To evaluate the business cases, a standard NPV analysis is carried out, by calculating 
the yearly discounted cash flows for every player. For technological projects, a discount 
factor between 10% and 15% is common (Verbrugge et al., 2009). The Capital Asset 
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 Pricing Model links return with risk, stating that investments bearing a higher risk 
require a higher return on investment (ROI) (Sharpe, 1963). The combination of a risky 
technological investment and low initial capital expenditures made us choose for an 
average required ROI of 12%. The considered projects are evaluated over the period 
2010-2019.  
The exact cost of the initial investments made for a physical network deployment and 
supporting services are very operator specific, and therefore approximations come with 
a degree of uncertainty. To handle these uncertainties, the model is built in a generic 
way, allowing easy modifications of input parameters. 
2.4. Regulation 
Regulation is an important aspect in the telecommunication sector. One main issue is 
directly related to this research topic: Competition regulation enforced by European and 
national governments. The most known example is the questioning of the city of 
Amsterdam by the European Commission (EC). Together with private investors, the 
municipal government financed the rollout of a large-scale fiber network. After 
complaints by other commercial players, the EC investigated if the city’s investment 
was compatible with state aid rules. From this case, it can be concluded that the 
municipality must participate in the project just like a private investor (the market 
economy investor principle) (RAPID, 2006).  
3. Viability of WiFi deployment 
This section describes the stand-alone business case for a WiFi player. After a brief 
overview of the used technology, an investment analysis is derived from the cost and 
revenue modeling.  
 3.1. Technical info 
WiFi (Wireless Fidelity) is a certification label for wireless local area network (WLAN) 
devices that comply with the international IEEE 802.11 standards and sub-standards. 
Those labels are distributed by the WiFi Alliance, and interoperability between 
different products is ensured. Different flavors of the IEEE 802.11 standard exist, 
where 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g and 802.11n are presently the most wide spread 
variants. WiFi devices were primarily intended to be installed and managed by the 
customer. However, some telecom operators are nowadays exploiting WiFi access 
points (APs) at public places to offer their clients a fast wireless Internet connection, as 
an extension to their main telecom services. 
In this paper, the recent 802.11n standard (released in October 2009) is used, because 
of the higher throughput, compared to the older standards. The 802.11n standard can be 
considered as the successor of 802.11g and it is backwards compatible with the latter. 
Two non-licensed radio frequency bands are defined for WiFi, i.e. 2.4 and 5 GHz, and 
there is opted for a 20 MHz channel bandwidth. The wireless municipality network is 
expected to work within the 2.4 GHz frequency band, for which three low-interfering 
20 MHz channels are available. A maximum achievable PHY data rate of 65 Mbps per 
20 MHz-channel can be attained. The 802.11n standard also supports multiple antenna 
techniques like Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO), which can extend either the 
data rate or the range of the WiFi signals. For outdoor APs, MIMO is better used to 
extend the wireless range while keeping a 65 Mbps channel, than to increase the data 
rate. 
3.2. Techno-economic model 
The used techno-economic model for WiFi is based on the model described in Van 
Ooteghem et al. (2009). Van Ooteghem et al. (2009) introduced a full economic 
 feasibility analysis of the rollout of a wireless access network in the city of Ghent. In 
this section, a summary of that model is provided and the main differences with the 
model used in this paper are indicated.  
3.2.1. Deployment model 
An import aspect of developing a full techno-economic model of a wireless access 
network is the calculation of the number of WiFi APs that need to be deployed in order 
to assure both coverage and sufficient available bandwidth to serve all users. Four 
import input factors to assess the needed number of APs can be distilled: covered area, 
number of users, required bandwidth and physical parameters of the technology. The 
physical parameters define the signal power, gains, losses, receiver sensitivity and 
margins (fade, shadow, interference …) for calculating the maximum range of the 
technology at a given data rate. Together with the three other input factors, the amount 
of needed APs can be defined. 
In Van Ooteghem et al. (2009) six different technical scenarios for deploying a wireless 
access network were proposed. Within these six technical scenarios, two main access 
technologies were considered: WiFi and WiMAX. The backhaul solutions were varied 
as follows: all APs individually connected to a fixed backhaul network (e.g. digital 
subscriber line (DSL) or fiber); meshed networks of a single wireless technology, 
reducing the number of fixed backhaul connections; or a combination between WiFi (as 
access) and WiMAX (as wireless backhaul) technology. The best choice found from a 
techno-economic point of view was a meshed WiFi network. The main deployment 
details can be found in Table 2. 
Table 2: WiFi deployment scenario 
Wireless 
connection 
Technology 
Antenna heights 
(m) 
 AP to user 
Backhaul 
WiFi 
WiFi 
6 to 1.5 
6 to 6 
 
3.2.2. Costs 
Costs are typically divided in two subsections. Upfront investment costs in fixed assets 
are called Capital Expenditures (CapEx), while recurring costs like maintenance and 
personnel costs are Operational Expenditures (OpEx).  
Capital Expenditures 
The deployment of a wireless access network requires a large upfront investment. Both 
WiFi APs and the wireless backhauling need to be installed. The APs will be subject to 
failure, caused by external factors like weather conditions and vandalism, so a 
replacement investment is assumed every five years. Next to the APs, an investment in 
central infrastructure is also necessary. This can be subdivided in core equipment, such 
as routers and servers, and general Network Operating Centre (NOC) infrastructure like 
power supplies and cooling. All costs are based on Van Ooteghem et al. (2009), but 
prices are set at the 2010 price level.  
Operational Expenditures 
WiFi APs are deployed on either public or private sites. Site rental will thus be a major 
aspect of the yearly OpEx. Access to public sites is typically cheaper than access to 
private sites. This is modeled by halving the cost for site rental when it concerns a 
public site. The reduction of administrative overhead and the cheaper access to sites as 
the major advantages of a municipal partner were already mentioned. This comes 
forward in the model in the proportion of public sites. In absence of a public player in 
the project, only 10% of all sites are assumed to be public. When a municipality steps 
into the partnership, this rate shifts completely, with 90% public sites. These numbers 
 are based on discussions with operators. The dimensioning provides the number of 
necessary sites.  
The backhauling APs will be connected to a fixed backhaul connection. A volume-
dependent connection price per connected AP per year is included. 
Operations, administration and maintenance (OA&M) are mainly driven by the number 
of APs and their equipment. Personnel costs for planning and maintenance of the APs 
are included (Vacature, 2010).  
The cost for Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is fully driven by the number 
of customers. Offering a new service raises for example the need for a helpdesk 
department. Lannoo, Verbrugge, Van Ooteghem, Quinart, Colle, Pickavet, and 
Demeester (2007) proposed a method to calculate the helpdesk cost. Cost of sales, 
marketing and advertising complete the CRM cost and are based on Van Ooteghem et 
al. (2009). 
3.2.3. Revenues 
Revenues fall apart in two categories. There are the direct revenues, driven by the 
number of customers. For indirect revenues, the link between the revenues and the 
main activity, here the sale of wireless access, is indirect. It is however the existence of 
indirect revenues that makes network infrastructure projects so important for public 
players.  
Direct revenues 
Direct revenues can be derived from the forecasted number of customers. A distinction 
between different service offers is made, based on Van Ooteghem et al. (2009). Table 3 
gives an overview of the monthly revenue per user for the different service categories 
for the considered network. The monthly revenues are based on prices for similar 
services offered by two commercial players in Belgium: namely the WiFi operator  
 ZapFi and the WiMAX operator Clearwire. ZapFi will offer a WiFi service with prices 
starting from €10 per month in a nearby city (ZapFi, 2010), while Clearwire currently 
offers WiMAX subscriptions ranging between €30 for 1Mbps and €45 for 3Mbps per 
month (Clearwire website). The prices used in this paper are thus a reasonable 
compromise between these two different offers. To be able to offer a free service, other 
parties can buy advertising space which will be displayed to customers using the free 
subscription possibilities. 
In Section 2.3, four different customer classes were described. Each class will have a 
different interest in each of the service offerings, as shown in Table 4. Inhabitants will 
be interested in using the free service, in addition to their existing fixed broadband 
connection. Students on the other hand will use the two monthly subscription 
possibilities as primary connection. The better bandwidth offer of these services will be 
more in line with their interests than the free service that only offers 512 kbps. Tourists 
and business users will mainly buy vouchers. While tourists are only interested in the 
vouchers and the free service, business users can, depending on their usage time, 
choose for a monthly subscription. 
Table 3: Monthly revenue per WiFi service 
Service 
Subscription fee 
(incl. VAT) 
Offered Bandwidth 
Downstream Upstream 
Free € 5 (advertising) 512 kbps 128 kbps 
Low-bandwidth € 12 1 Mbps 256 kbps 
High-bandwidth € 20 3 Mbps 512 kbps 
Vouchers (per card) € 9 1 Mbps 256 kbps 
 
Table 4: Customer class and interest in WiFi services 
Service Inhabitants Students Tourists Business 
Free 60% 5% 20% 10% 
Low- 25% 60% 0% 10% 
 bandwidth 
High-
bandwidth 
15% 35% 0% 20% 
Vouchers 0% 0% 80% 60% 
 
Indirect revenues 
It was already pointed out that indirect revenues form a major driver for public 
authorities to invest in NGANs. Indirect revenues are additional advantages caused by 
the main activity. Efficiency gains in public services are one of the drivers for indirect 
revenues. The wireless network helps the municipality in promoting several eServices. 
Next to these gains, this project can attract new businesses, extra employment and tax 
revenues. Due to the broad spectrum of possible indirect advantages, it is hard to 
estimate the total indirect revenues a project generates. A distinction is made between 
four different drivers to evaluate the indirect revenues, namely fixed, customer, service 
and investment. 
Fixed indirect revenues have no specific driver, but setting up a wireless platform 
allows deploying new applications, which can lead to efficiency gains and cost 
reductions. Customers drive the second part of indirect revenues, as the impact of for 
example an eGovernment application or social network is assessed by the amount of 
users. A third part is service based: an increased wireless coverage and bandwidth 
might benefit several new applications like e-health and video services. The last 
component of indirect revenues is investment driven. The municipality can expect to 
attract companies and high educated inhabitants due to such an investment. A part of 
the invested money will flow back in the regional economy, and taxation will generate 
a money flow to the local government. The calculation of the indirect revenues is based 
on Van Ooteghem et al. (2009). 
 3.3. Investment analysis 
From the cost and revenue models discussed above, a detailed investment analysis is 
carried out. All customer classes are considered, and they can choose from the different 
services offered. Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the cumulative NPV over the lifetime of 
the project. The combination of a high initial investment and slow user adoption gives a 
negative NPV in the first years. The payback period is over 6 years. After 10 years, an 
NPV of almost €3.2 million is obtained. 
 
Fig. 2: NPV evolution of WiFi network 
 
4. Viability of 3G femtocells deployment 
This section evaluates the stand-alone business case for a 3G player, extending its 
macrocell network to femtocells.  
4.1. Technical info 
3G coverage can be extended by installing femtocells at the customers’ house. The 
technical aspects of both 3G and femtocells are described in the following subsections. 
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 4.1.1. 3G technology 
The third generation of mobile telephony (3G, like UMTS) refers to the transformation 
of the digital mobile telephony technology (2G, like GSM) to a full mobile Internet 
access technology. The third generation partnership project (3GPP) tries to provide 
uniform standardizations for these and other 3G flavors. Release 99 was the original 
UMTS version. A user typically gets up to 384 kbps downlink for R99 handsets. Other 
releases (R4 - originally Release 2000, R5, R6, R7, R8 and R9) are already specified to 
further improve the UMTS technology. The UMTS successor is HSDPA, introduced in 
Release 5. It improves the downlink data rate for UMTS by using shared channels for 
different users. As this is an improvement of the 3G UMTS standard technology, it is 
called a 3.5G technology. 3GPP standards beyond Release 5 further improve the data 
rate. Release 6 introduces High Speed Uplink Packet Access (HSUPA), new antenna 
array technologies (beam forming and MIMO) and a new uplink transport channel. It 
targets 28.8 Mbps downlink and 5.8 Mbps uplink. HSUPA clearly improves the uplink, 
and is sometimes referred to as 3.75G technology. Release 7 introduces evolved High 
Speed Packet Access (HSPA) or HSPA+. The target is 42 Mbps downlink and 22 Mbps 
uplink. Release 8 and 9 introduce Long Term Evolution (LTE) and the Evolved Packet 
Core (EPC). LTE promises peak rates up to 100 Mbps in downlink and 50 Mbps in 
uplink. 
4.1.2. Femtocells 
A femtocell is a small cellular base station designed for indoor use. It connects to the 
service provider’s network via the customer’s broadband connection instead of 
connecting via the local mast. So no additional costs for site deployment occur. A 
femtocell typically supports two to five mobile devices in a residential setting (Tatara 
Systems, 2009).  
 Femtocells are able to provide exceptional cellular service with a typical coverage 
range of tens of meters. For an MNO, femtocells are attractive, since they can 
significantly increase the achievable data rates on its mobile network at the customer’s 
property. This is very interesting since delivering high-quality mobile services inside 
buildings is on one hand a tough challenge for 3G because it uses higher frequency 
bands where radio signals attenuate more rapidly. On the other hand fast data rates are 
only possible with a strong signal. Individual connections to the femtocell offload 
traffic from the macrocellular network, thereby improving network quality for the 
remaining users (Clausen, 2008). 
In this paper, the macrocell 3G (or 3.5G / 3.75G) network of an MNO is extended with 
femtocells installed by a fixed network operator at the customer side. The fixed 
network operator then provides access to its customers through both femto- and 
macrocells (having agreements with the MNO for the latter), and is acting as MVNO. 
The used release of the 3G technology will depend on the network of the MNO. 
4.2. Techno-economic model 
The used techno-economic model for 3G femtocells is based on the model described in 
Lannoo et al. (2009) and is briefly introduced in this section. Lannoo et al. (2009) built 
a first competition model between a WiFi and 3G femtocell operator in the city of 
Ghent, and this paper extends the previous work with more advanced and realistic 
competition settings. 
4.2.1. Costs 
Capital expenditures 
For the introduction of 3G femtocells, four scenarios were developed. In each scenario, 
the MVNO chooses a different subsidization rate of the femtocells. Typically, an 
 operator can choose to either charge the customer for the femtocell, or it can buy the 
femtocell itself, and charge the customer an extra subscription cost. A summary of the 
different scenarios can be found in Table 5. The operator will need to finance all or a 
percentage of the femtocell costs, depending on the chosen scenario. After five years, 
these femtocells are replaced by new ones. 
For the deployment of a 3G femtocell network, there are also important network 
investments required in core equipment. A femtocell gateway needs installation and 
integration with the existing back office systems. An operator will typically opt for a 
nationwide rollout of closed access 3G femtocells. To assure comparability with the 
municipal WiFi rollout, these costs are scaled down to the municipal level. In addition, 
a replacement investment is included every five years. All costs are based on Lannoo et 
al. (2009), and prices are again set at the 2010 price level. 
Table 5: Different 3G subsidization scenarios 
Scenario Subsidization Monthly subscription fee 
1) Full subsidization 
scenario 
100% € 20 
2) 50% subsidization 
scenario 
50% € 18 
3) No subsidization 
scenario 
0% € 16 
4) Combinatory scenario Combination Weighted average 
 
Operational expenditures 
Next to the recurring maintenance, a cost for the additional usage of the fixed line 
connection of the customer is included based on Chandrasekhar, Andrews, and 
Gatherer (2008). For the maintenance cost of the core equipment, a fractional approach 
of the total CapEx is used, as done by Clausen, Ho, and Samuel (2008). 
 Unlike the WiFi network case, a mobile license is necessary for the 3G network. The 
cost is influenced by the channel bandwidth, population and the number of BSs. A 
fixed annual cost per customer per year is included (Lannoo et al., 2009). 
To assure comparability with the WiFi case, the same model for the promotion and 
helpdesk costs is used. The marketing cost is put lower. Since the 3G operator deploys 
a nationwide network, it can benefit from economies of scale.  
4.2.2. Revenues 
Only direct revenues are considered for the commercial 3G operator. The first three 
subsidization scenarios are straightforward. Scenario 4 offers flexibility to the 
customer. In the first years, with high prices for femtocells, customers will opt for 
leasing the femtocell. For example, in the first year, 80% of customers will choose for a 
lease agreement. With femtocell prices dropping fast, customers will become aware of 
cost benefits when buying their own femtocell. In 2019, it is expected that only 20% of 
the customers will choose for leasing the femtocell. 
The operator offers closed access femtocells. This opens up possibilities to offer 
enhanced services, like virtual home numbers or SMS alerts. Not all users will show 
the same interest in these services. Mostly families with teenagers will be interested in 
additional services. Therefore, additional revenues for extra services of €5.20 are only 
added for families with three or more members (Signal research group, 2009). This 
comes down to about 40% of all households in Belgium. 
In contrast with the WiFi case, one femtocell per household is needed. The number of 
adopting inhabitants is divided by the average household size in Ghent, being 2.10. For 
business users, a distinction between small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large 
enterprises is made. For SMEs, which account for 85% of all businesses, two 
 femtocells per business suffice. Large enterprises, with over 100 employees, are 
covered with 20 3G femtocells. 
4.3. Investment analysis 
The investment analysis is carried out the same way as for the WiFi operator. The NPV 
evolution of all four scenarios can be found in Fig. 3. All scenarios have a positive 
payoff, with a payback time around two years. This is considerably shorter than the 
payback period for the WiFi network deployment. The case where the operator 
subsidizes 100% is clearly the most profitable, with an NPV of almost €6 million after 
10 years. 
 
Fig. 3: NPV of different subsidization scenarios for a 3G femtocell network 
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 5. Competition modeling 
5.1. Game theory 
Game theory is “aimed at modeling situations in which decision makers have to make 
specific actions that have mutual, possibly conflicting, consequences” (Felegyhazi & 
Hubaux, 2006, p. 1).  
The game between the players described before is investigated. All players play at the 
same time and have sufficiently good knowledge of each other’s possible strategies and 
payoffs. These assumptions allow representing the game by means of a payoff matrix. 
This matrix has a payoff (e.g. NPV) for all players for each possible combination of 
strategies. This is called the strategic form of the game and allows to find an 
equilibrium in the game. An equilibrium is a set of strategies (one for each player) at 
which players are not inclined to change their strategy. Different equilibrium concepts 
have been proposed in the field of game theory. The most commonly known 
equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is defined as a situation in which no 
player can gain by unilaterally changing its strategy. In a pure NE, each player will use 
a pure strategy, whereas in a mixed NE, the players can play mixes (probabilistic 
combinations) of strategies (Felegyhazi & Hubaux, 2006). It is often assumed that a 
game with fully rational players (using this equilibrium as criterion) is expected to 
result in one of the NEs being chosen. 
Typically static games (the game has one stage in which the players interact) can also 
be reduced or solved by removing strictly dominated strategies. These dominated 
strategies have a strictly lower payoff than another (dominant) strategy for all possible 
counterstrategies. No fully rational player would play a strictly dominated strategy but 
would instead play the dominant strategy. As such this strategy can be removed for the 
considered player. By iteratively using this approach for the different players, the 
 matrix of the game can be simplified and can in some case be solved to a unique 
strategic choice for each player. In these cases, this strictly dominant strategy set is the 
only NE of the game.  
5.2. Strategies 
Since the different players operate in the same geographical market, the total market 
potential can be modeled by the adoption curve presented in Section 2.1. Lannoo et al. 
(2009) provides a detailed overview of the division of the market between the different 
players. 
The main strategy to attract customers studied in this paper is price change. The WiFi 
player has price schemes based on the offered service. Its strategy will therefore be 
changing its premium subscription price, either up or down. The other services are also 
offered, and their price scales up or down based on the change of the high bandwidth 
service price. For the 3G femtocell player, an extra strategic option emerges. Next to 
changing its premium subscription price, this player can choose between different 
subsidization rates. In Lannoo et al. (2009) the price setting strategy was chosen. This 
work is now complemented with the subsidization strategic choice. Both WiFi players 
are offered an extra strategic choice, namely cooperation via a PPP. Under this strategy, 
the four WiFi services are offered by the PPP. Costs and revenues are adequately 
shared between both players. Since the municipality does not have profit, but public 
welfare as its main driver, the non-profit behavior was added to the business case via 
the indirect revenues concept.  
 6. Competition or partnership between WiFi operators? 
Since a municipality acts in the best interest for its inhabitants, the strategic decision 
variable for the municipality in this game will be the maximization of the sum of its 
payoff and the discounted indirect revenues. 
Some additional potential problems need to be tackled before modeling this game. State 
aid is not allowed, so the municipality must invest according to the market economy 
investor principle. Similar to the Amsterdam case, mentioned in section 2.4, the 
municipality in this model invests 30% of the necessary funds, and reaps 30% of the 
benefits, if any.  
The municipality can also choose to rollout an independent network. In this situation, 
its strategies concur with the price strategies of the commercial WiFi player. Table 6 
summarizes the different strategies for each player. 
Table 6: Strategic choices for each player 
Player Strategy Strategic choices 
1 Commercial WiFi Price strategy € 18 - € 21 
2 Municipal WiFi 
Partnership & price 
strategy 
Independent vs. PPP 
€ 18 - € 21 
3 3G player Price strategy 
Subsidization 
percentage 
 
 
These strategies result in an asymmetric matrix. Player 1 and 3 both have four different 
options, while Player 2 has five. The resulting payoff matrix can be found in Table 7. It 
can be concluded that the municipality will choose for a PPP with the commercial 
player. This strategy is strictly dominant for the independent strategic choice. Using 
strict dominance, the NE (0.05 ; 1.56 ; 1.10) can be derived. It is indicated in negative 
in Table 7. The municipality should always choose to partner with a commercial player. 
 The impact of other adoption choices on the NE was also checked. Both a lower and a 
higher adoption resulted in the same equilibrium being chosen, even with adoption 
curves not only differing by a multiplicative factor. Therefore it can be concluded that 
the results are not impacted by the adoption choices made. 
When the NE is analyzed for the other players, it is clear that it is also in the best 
interest for the commercial WiFi player to engage in this PPP. Direct competition with 
the municipality would result in a negative business case, while the PPP offers a 
slightly positive payoff for the commercial player. Due to this minimal result, the 
reasons for the commercial player to engage in this PPP could be questioned. Non 
profit related incentives for the commercial player would be brand image, customer 
satisfaction or reduced churn. The municipality could also offer extra advantages to the 
private player, like free site access or backhaul, so both players benefit from the 
partnership. 
The 3G player will, in contradiction with the results of the static business case analysis 
from Section 4.3, not choose for the full subsidization scenario. When this player 
lowers its monthly subscription prices, it gains extra market share that compensates the 
lower profit margins. It is clear that a game theoretic analysis offers more detailed 
insight in the price setting game played by all players. A naive player would choose to 
fully subsidize the 3G femtocells, while it is clear that this strategy does not result in 
the highest payoff.  
A price war behavior was also noticed in the game theoretic analysis. The equilibrium 
consists of the lowest price for the premium service. The WiFi players have an 
intention to keep lowering their prices, to capture extra market share. Continuously 
lowering prices would result in negative profit margins, which is forbidden by national 
and European legislation. Too low prices compared with other, mainly fixed services, 
 offered by the commercial player, could result in an increase churn from fixed towards 
mobile access, shifting part of the resources to the mobile market. 
  
 Table 7: Strategic form for partnership scenario, dominant strategies in negative (NPV in M€, lifetime of 10 years) 
    2. Municipality 
  
 
enabler independent independent independent independent 
1. Commercial Wifi 3. 3G   
 
  18 19 20 21 
18 
Scenario 1 0.33 1.81 0.52 -1.75 0.23 -0.17 -1.73 0.12 -0.10 -1.67 -0.04 0.07 -1.61 -0.26 0.23 
Scenario 2 0.18 1.68 0.87 -2.19 -0.15 0.40 -2.14 -0.26 0.43 -2.06 -0.44 0.55 -2.00 -0.70 0.69 
Scenario 3 0.05 1.56 1.10 -2.57 -0.51 0.80 -2.52 -0.62 0.85 -2.43 -0.82 0.96 -2.35 -1.10 1.05 
Scenario 4 0.21 1.70 0.74 -2.16 -0.10 0.26 -2.10 -0.21 0.30 -2.02 -0.40 0.41 -1.95 -0.64 0.52 
19 
Scenario 1 0.26 1.71 0.57 -1.77 0.36 -0.10 -1.74 0.26 -0.04 -1.67 0.08 0.13 -1.60 -0.13 0.29 
Scenario 2 0.12 1.59 0.91 -2.19 0.00 0.43 -2.14 -0.12 0.48 -2.06 -0.29 0.60 -1.98 -0.55 0.73 
Scenario 3 0.00 1.48 1.13 -2.61 -0.35 0.84 -2.54 -0.44 0.89 -2.44 -0.67 1.00 -2.36 -0.92 1.07 
Scenario 4 0.16 1.62 0.78 -2.13 0.03 0.30 -2.07 -0.07 0.34 -2.00 -0.24 0.46 -1.92 -0.49 0.57 
20 
Scenario 1 0.20 1.64 0.76 -1.83 0.58 0.07 -1.78 0.47 0.14 -1.69 0.30 0.30 -1.62 0.10 0.45 
Scenario 2 0.07 1.53 1.08 -2.28 0.22 0.57 -2.25 0.10 0.62 -2.15 -0.06 0.75 -2.06 -0.30 0.86 
Scenario 3 -0.05 1.42 1.27 -2.67 -0.12 0.98 -2.63 -0.22 1.02 -2.53 -0.44 1.08 -2.44 -0.68 1.17 
Scenario 4 0.11 1.57 0.93 -2.22 0.25 0.42 -2.18 0.15 0.47 -2.08 -0.02 0.58 -1.99 -0.26 0.71 
21 
Scenario 1 0.13 1.57 0.93 -1.94 0.79 0.25 -1.90 0.70 0.31 -1.80 0.53 0.47 -1.73 0.35 0.55 
Scenario 2 0.00 1.45 1.21 -2.40 0.44 0.72 -2.33 0.34 0.77 -2.22 0.16 0.88 -2.15 -0.07 1.01 
Scenario 3 -0.12 1.34 1.40 -2.82 0.13 1.07 -2.77 0.00 1.11 -2.65 -0.19 1.20 -2.53 -0.43 1.29 
Scenario 4 0.04 1.49 1.05 -2.32 0.48 0.55 -2.28 0.39 0.60 -2.18 0.22 0.73 -2.08 -0.01 0.84 
 7. Viability of the PPP under extra 3G competition 
In the previous paragraph, a PPP between a municipal and a commercial WiFi operator 
was found to be the dominant strategic choice. However, the low result for the 
commercial WiFi player is a reason for concern. In a realistic setting, typically more 
than one provider has the ability to offer 3G access. In Belgium, three players obtained 
a 3G license, and two of them can effectively offer full 3G coverage to their customers. 
In this section, the impact of extra 3G MVNOs entering the market will be researched. 
Extra players competing in the same market will reduce the customer base of the PPP, 
and thereby further reduce its payoff. This could jeopardize the PPP altogether, as in 
the case of a negative payoff, the commercial partner has no intention to participate. 
In this strategic game, the PPP is played out against two 3G players, in order to model a 
more realistic scenario. Only the payoff of the commercial partner is presented in the 
strategic form, to improve readability of the matrix. The PPP can choose between the 
four different premium service price settings. The strategies for the two 3G players are 
the different subsidization scenarios. They are listed in Table 8. The resulting strategic 
form can be found in Table 9. 
The NE found for this game (-0.82 ; 0.67 ; 0.67) again shows the 3G MVNOs opting 
for the no subsidization scenario. It is clear that in a competitive environment, the lower 
subsidization costs weigh up against the lower subscription revenues.  
Notice the negative payoff for the commercial WiFi player. Participating in a WiFi 
network rollout proofs to be unprofitable under these conditions. The game theoretic 
results fit with the observation that only few municipal wide WiFi networks are rolled 
out. However, it should be noted that the total payoff for the PPP under these 
circumstances remains positive. Again, changing the initial adoption assumptions did 
not influence the resulting NE. 
 Table 8: Strategic choices for the different players in the realistic game 
Player Strategy Strategic choices 
1 PPP WiFi Price strategy € 18 - € 21 
2 3G player 1 Price strategy 
Subsidization 
percentage 
3 3G player 2 Price strategy 
Subsidization 
percentage 
 
 Table 9: Strategic form for the realistic scenario, dominant strategy in negative (NPV in M€, lifetime of 10 years)  
    2. 3G 
1. Commercial Wifi 3. 3G Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
18 
Scenario 1 0.03 0.49 0.49 -0.16 0.78 0.23 -0.32 1.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.65 0.28 
Scenario 2 -0.16 0.23 0.78 -0.40 0.57 0.57 -0.60 0.87 0.38 -0.36 0.45 0.61 
Scenario 3 -0.32 0.03 1.04 -0.60 0.38 0.87 -0.82 0.67 0.67 -0.54 0.26 0.91 
Scenario 4 -0.09 0.28 0.65 -0.36 0.61 0.45 -0.54 0.91 0.26 -0.30 0.47 0.47 
19 
Scenario 1 -0.14 0.47 0.47 -0.35 0.78 0.26 -0.49 1.03 0.01 -0.28 0.66 0.30 
Scenario 2 -0.35 0.26 0.78 -0.58 0.57 0.57 -0.73 0.87 0.38 -0.52 0.44 0.62 
Scenario 3 -0.49 0.01 1.03 -0.73 0.38 0.87 -0.95 0.67 0.67 -0.68 0.27 0.91 
Scenario 4 -0.28 0.30 0.66 -0.52 0.62 0.44 -0.68 0.91 0.27 -0.47 0.48 0.48 
20 
Scenario 1 -0.38 0.52 0.52 -0.55 0.85 0.36 -0.69 1.07 0.12 -0.49 0.72 0.40 
Scenario 2 -0.55 0.36 0.85 -0.78 0.65 0.65 -0.94 0.94 0.46 -0.73 0.52 0.70 
Scenario 3 -0.69 0.12 1.07 -0.94 0.46 0.94 -1.17 0.75 0.75 -0.87 0.34 0.97 
Scenario 4 -0.49 0.40 0.72 -0.73 0.70 0.52 -0.87 0.97 0.34 -0.66 0.56 0.56 
21 
Scenario 1 -0.65 0.59 0.59 -0.81 0.92 0.45 -0.94 1.12 0.23 -0.76 0.79 0.50 
Scenario 2 -0.81 0.45 0.92 -1.01 0.73 0.73 -1.20 0.97 0.54 -0.97 0.59 0.76 
Scenario 3 -0.94 0.23 1.12 -1.20 0.54 0.97 -1.42 0.82 0.82 -1.13 0.42 1.00 
Scenario 4 -0.76 0.50 0.79 -0.97 0.76 0.59 -1.13 1.00 0.42 -0.91 0.63 0.63 
 
 8. Conclusion 
A lot of attention is going to city-wide wireless access networks, since they promise to 
bring ubiquitous broadband access together with a broad range of advantages, like a 
stimulus for economic growth and extra employment. However, the rollout of these 
networks is only taking off slowly. By investigating the prevailing cooperation and 
competition models between WiFi and 3G players in a realistic competitive 
environment, this paper shows how the application of game theory on a realistic case 
fits these observations.  
Two important questions concerning this topic are answered in this paper. First, the 
strategic behavior of a public authority and commercial operators when they choose to 
invest in a wireless next generation access network (NGAN) is researched. Detailed 
numerical business models for the different players were developed, which all showed 
to be profitable when a standard economic investment analysis was performed. 
However, this analysis cannot capture the impact of competition on the different 
business cases. Using a game theoretic approach to model this competitive 
environment, the cooperation and competition between the different players was 
studied. The model clearly showed that when the WiFi players roll out the network 
simultaneously and independently in this environment, their business cases are not 
profitable. Using the Nash equilibrium concept from game theory, it was proven that a 
public private partnership (PPP) is the only possible cooperation model for public and 
commercial WiFi players to roll out a city-wide wireless access network. An additional 
result from this analysis is the different strategy chosen by the 3G mobile virtual 
network operator (MVNO). The best scenario found in the static analysis proofs to be 
the least interesting choice in the competitive setting. While the static analysis suggest 
to choose for the highest monthly subscription price, the game theoretic analysis shows 
 that the higher market share gained by a lower subscription price offsets the lower 
revenues per customer. It is clear that game theory offers valuable insight to decision 
makers for investment analysis compared to the static NPV analysis. 
The second question focuses on the strategic behavior of the different players when 
extra competition enters the market. While a PPP was shown to be the only prevailing 
strategy for the WiFi operators, the market reaction when extra 3G players enter the 
market were investigated. The extra competition poses problems for the WiFi 
partnership, since its market share is reduced. Building further on the game theoretic 
model, a new strategic game was developed with extra 3G players competing for the 
market share with the PPP. Although the payoff in equilibrium state for the entire PPP 
remained positive, it was shown that the return for the commercial player in the PPP 
becomes negative, thereby completely removing its incentive to participate in the 
partnership. No intention to either rollout an independent or a joined WiFi network 
remains. These findings fit the overall observation that the rollout of municipal wireless 
networks remains slow.  
As subsidization is not allowed, the municipality must find other ways to convince the 
commercial player to step into the PPP. Topics of future work should focus on these 
options for the municipality. Providing cheap backhauling and cheap access to public 
sites are only a few possibilities. Note that an improved WiFi technology also will 
reduce the number of antennas needed, which will also have positive effects on the 
final business case. The trend for the lowest price setting in the game theoretic 
approach was also mentioned. This could result in a price war behavior. Does this trend 
persist, or is there a point where the increased market share does not weigh up to the 
lowering return per user? In addition, the price competition could also be extended with 
a more service based competition. 
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